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ABSTRACT: Both early and later forms of Buddhism developed a set of arguments to 
demonstrate that the self is an illusion. This article begins with a brief review of some 
of the arguments but then proceeds to show that these arguments are not themselves 
sufficient to dispel the illusion. It analyzes three ways in which the illusion of self 
manifests itself – as wish fulfillment, as a cognitive illusion, and as a phenomenal 
illusion (what might be called the “I” sense). With respect to this last, the article 
reviews some recent developments in cognitive neuropsychology and neuroscience to 
discuss the way in which the phenomenal illusion of self is encoded within our brain 
processes. This article also considers the way in which the illusion of self is constructed 
through social interaction, by episodic memory, and by narrative construction. Finally, 
it focuses on how the illusion of self developed as an evolutionary necessity to make it 
possible for the human organism to navigate physical and social reality; and that it 
continues to be useful today. This poses a dilemma for the Buddhist soteriological 
project of extinguishing the illusion of self. Specifically, while it is possible to develop 
a non-self perspective though the continued practice of vipassanā (mindfulness 
meditation), it is not possible to maintain it consistently. The article concludes that 
even fully enlightened individuals must sometimes oscillate between a non-self 
perspective and a self-perspective and suggests an analogy between this oscillation 
and what occurs in the Kanizsa square illusion. 
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We all know the power of visual illusions to trick the mind into perceiving things 
incorrectly, but the most powerful illusion is the sense that we exist inside our heads as an 
integrated, coherent individual or self (Hood 2012, 3). 
 
Buddhist thought about the self and about self-consciousness is grounded in the idea that 
we are subject to profound cognitive illusions, and one of those is that we are distinct selves 
(Garfield 2018, 294). 
________________________ 
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Belief in a self is deeply implicated in some of our most fundamental cognitive and 
affective structures (Siderits 2015, 46). 
 
While there are many different schools of Buddhism and a number of disagreements 
even within each school, all of them endorse the doctrine of no self (ānatta). The 
doctrine of no self claims that the view that the self exists is not simply a false idea but 
a fundamental illusion which is the underlying basis for suffering (dukkha) and whose 
dissolution is necessary for enlightenment/awakening. In this article, I want to develop an 
analysis of what it means for the self to be an illusion, how that illusion is constructed 
by both our cognitive and our affective habits of mind, and the extent to which it is 
really possible to extinguish that illusion of self. I will, however, also consider some 
possible objections to my analysis. 
 
1.  WHAT IS THE IDEA OF THE SELF  
THAT IS BEING DENIED BY BUDDHISM? 
 
It is important to say at the outset that Buddhism is not denying that there exists a self 
in any sense of the term. “The Buddha never said that there is no self, only that the self 
is a mistaken interpretation of experience” (Olendzki 2016, 41). As we shall see, the 
root of this “mistaken interpretation” exists on a number of levels but involves 
mistaking a set of impermanent processes for a permanent thing. “Gotama no more 
rejected the existence of the self than Copernicus rejected the existence of the Earth. 
Instead, rather than regarding it as a fixed, non-contingent point around which 
everything turned, he recognized that each self was a fluid, contingent process just like 
everything else” (Batchelor 2011, 133). As we shall see, this fluid contingent process 
is, in fact a set of interacting contingent processes, and, in order to avoid confusion, I 
think it is better to use the term “person” for the sum of these processes.  
In any event, in contrast to the idea of the “self” or person as a set of fluid, 
contingent processes, the view of the self that is being denied is the view that takes the 
self to have at least the following characteristics: 
 
• The subject of experience which observes my experiences and is yet distinct 
from them; it is the first-person perspective;  
• The substance self which underlies the psychophysical processes that constitute 
the person;  
• The essential core of the person which makes me who I am; this core contains 
the essential properties of the substance self which constitute me as the subject 
of my experience; 
• A permanent self  that remains the same even as all my mental and physical 
properties change over time; thus, the essential core of the person does not 
change; 
• An ownership self that possesses all the psychophysical processes; it is the 
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•  An independent self  that, although it interacts with other individuals, is 
ontologically  distinct from them;  
• A unitary self that unifies the elements of the person, both synchronically and 
diachronically into a single whole; the self is one, not many; 
• An agent, an executive self that is capable of controlling both my actions and 
mental processes; it is sometimes called the CEO self; 
• A bounded self which creates a duality between what is me and what is not me, 
between myself and others. 
 
These various features are interwoven into our general concept of the self. Thus, what 
is being denied by Buddhism is the existence of a substantial, unchanging, independent 
and unitary entity with an essential core which is both the subject and possessor of my 
experiences and body, while yet distinct from them, which separates what is me from 
what is not me, and which is also the agent that controls my actions, desires, and 
thoughts. The belief that we have such a self is for Buddhism, a cognitive illusion. I 
will soon discuss the way in which this cognitive illusion is bound up with an illusion 
that functions at the phenomenal level – an intuition or feeling that all of what appears 
to consciousness is mine, that it is observed and controlled by me, an intuition which 
may be called the “I” sense or the phenomenal sense of self; or more simply, the 
phenomenal self. 
 
2.  ARGUMENTS FOR NO-SELF 
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to be clear about why Buddhism claims that 
the self, as defined above, does not exist. The idea of the self that is denied by Buddhism 
is based on a soteriological project, a project which seeks to free us from dukkha, often 
translated as suffering, but which is better understood as a sense of unsatisfactoriness 
which pervades human life as it is ordinarily lived, an existential unease which 
continues to exist even in moments of pleasure and joy. For Buddhism, the proximate 
cause of this suffering is craving and attachment, but this is, in turn, generated by the 
belief in the self as defined above. Thus, the possibility of freeing ourselves from 
dukkha requires that we extinguish this belief and whatever illusions are bound up with 
it, that we extinguish the illusion of self.1  To do this requires both philosophical 
analysis and argument and meditative practice. 
In this section, I want to focus on the philosophical arguments. The claim that the 
self as defined above does not exist rests on what can be called the reductionist strategy. 
This strategy reduces the person to a set of psychophysical processes, which Buddhism 
 
1 Freeing ourselves from dukkha is understood as the attainment of Nirvana, which literally means “to 
extinguish.” What is extinguished is dukkha, the cravings and aversions which bring it about, and the 
illusion of self from which the cravings and aversions arise. In so doing, what is extinguished is also the 
“fires” of greed (lobha) or lust (raga), hatred (dosa), and ignorance or delusion (moha). These are the 
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called skandhas, or aggregates. The early Buddhism of the Pāli Canon2 grouped these 
processes into five aggregates: material form (rūpa), which refers to all matter but 
especially the body and its sense organs; feeling (vedanā), which refers to the feeling 
quality of sensations as pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral; perception (saññā), which 
refers to the judgment that recognizes objects and categorizes them; mental or 
volitional formations (sankhāra), which refers to all mental constructions including 
thoughts, intention, emotions, desires, and wishes; and consciousness (viññāna), which 
is the awareness of physical and mental objects. The Pāli Canon then proceeds to 
examine each of these aggregates separately and, in what may be called the criterion 
argument, argues that none of them can be a self either separately or collectively. There 
are two criteria for something to qualify as a self that are emphasized in this argument. 
The first is the criterion of permanence which cannot be fulfilled, since, for Buddhism, 
everything is impermanent, and this includes the psychophysical processes that 
constitute the person. The Pāli Canon argues that none of the aggregates either 
individually or collectively are permanent. Questions like the following are asked. Is 
the body or our physical processes a self? Are our sensations and feelings a self? Are 
our thoughts, intentions, or desires a self? Is our awareness of these processes a self? 
The answer to all these and other similar questions is no, since each of these physical 
or mental processes is constantly changing. They cannot be a self, as one of the basic 
criteria for being a self is that it be permanent. The question is then asked, can the 
totality of these processes be a self. But here again, the answer is no, since the totality 
of these physical and mental processes are constantly changing. Thus, since part of 
what it means to be a self is that the entity in question be permanent, the totality of 
these processes cannot be a self. The second criterion that is advanced in this argument 
is the criterion of control. For the self to be an agent, for it to be an executive control 
center, it must be capable of controlling each of the aggregates. But again none of the 
aggregates either separately or collectively is subject to control. We cannot control the 
processes that arise in either the mind or the body. Thus, here again, none of the 
aggregates either separately or collectively can be a self. 
If these arguments are correct, they establish that none of the aggregates is a self 
and that the aggregates collectively cannot be a self. However, these arguments alone 
could not establish that there is no self, since the self could in principle be something 
beyond the aggregates, something which is permanent and which controls the 
aggregates but which is not itself one of the aggregates, something that is a possessor 
and observer of the aggregates but not itself the aggregates. In traditional Brahmanic 
thinking, this is the ātman, the true self, something which transcends the aggregates 
 
2 The Pāli Canon, named for the language in which it was written, consists of three large sets of texts 
known as the Tipitaka (“three baskets”). The first set of texts is the Vinaya Pitaka the rules and 
regulations prescribed for monastics. The second is known as the Sutta Pitaka and contains suttas (verses) 
grouped into five large collections known as Nikāyas (discourses). The third is the Abhidamma Pitaka 
which was written after the Buddha’s death and is an attempt to develop a systematic Buddhist 
philosophy.  The five Nikāyas purport to record the dialogues between the historical Buddha and other 
persons, often his disciples, and sometimes between his disciples. They are generally regarded as the 
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and which is the permanent observer and controller of them. Thus, in order for the 
Buddhist argument to establish that there is no self, it must make an additional claim 
which is sometimes called the exhaustiveness claim, the claim that every aspect of the 
person is accounted for by the five aggregates, that the person is nothing more than the 
five aggregates. If this claim is correct, then in conjunction with the arguments above, 
it would establish that while there are persons, they are empty of self.3 
If there was something more to the person than the five aggregates, this would need 
to be established by direct observation or by inference. But surely, as Western 
philosophers like David Hume noted, we do not through introspection directly observe 
a self which is separate from the stream of our experiences. The only possibility, then, 
of affirming such a self is through inference. Such an inference would take the form of 
arguing that while the self cannot be directly perceived within experience, it is 
something which we must assume in order to account for certain aspects of our 
experience. One of the main forms of inference which is thought to establish the 
existence of a self as transcendent to our psychophysical processes arises from the need 
to explain the apparent continuity of the stream of experiences. If there is no substantive 
agent behind the stream, what is it that keeps the stream going? What keeps the stream 
of mental and physical processes going over time? The Buddhist answer is to be found 
in the doctrine of dependent origination (dependent arising or dependent co-arising).4 
This doctrine maintains that all phenomena are dependent for their existence on other 
phenomena in a complex causal chain. Everything that exists is dependent for its 
existence on other things that exist. Therefore, each of the mental and physical 
processes that constitute the person arises as the causal result of other mental and 
physical processes. For example, the thought I have now was brought about by previous 
thoughts or by some sensation, desire, or emotion; that thought may also bring about 
certain new desires or emotions, which will, in turn, bring about still other thoughts, 
desires, or emotions; and so on. In other words, the stream is kept going by the causality 
of the processes themselves. Thus, to explain the stream, there is no need to posit an “I” 
behind the stream that keeps it going. There is no “selfing” glue which binds our mental 
and physical processes together over time. “There is no unmoving mover behind the 
movement. It is only movement....there is no thinker behind the thought. Thought itself 
is the thinker. If you remove the thought, there is no thinker to be found” (Rahula 1974, 
26). The same holds of any other set of physical or mental processes. 
A related problem is the problem of diachronic unification – why a multiplicity of 
mental states over time is all taken to be mine. How, for example, is the memory image 
that I have at the moment related to the perception in the past which I remember? How 
does the memory of the pleasure which an object gave me in the past engender a desire 
 
3 This needs some clarification. The Buddhist analysis of no-self does not claim that there are no persons 
but rather that there is nothing within what we call the person which can be called a self. Thus, the point 
of saying that the person is empty of self is that (a) the totality of these psychophysical processes cannot 
be a self and (b) that there is no additional entity beyond them to which the term “self” could accurately 
refer. 
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for that object when I encounter that object in the present? Does this not require a 
unifying observer, a unifying subject of my experiences which persists over time? Here 
again, the doctrine of dependent origination provides the answer. Perceptions, 
memories, and desires that are “mine” are part of a complex causal series. Thus, the 
Buddhist answer to the problem is that “the need for an observer self that fuels the 
diachronic unification argument is the product of a powerful illusion fostered by our 
use of the convenient designator ‘person.’ The key…is the notion of a causal series. 
They [Buddhist Reductionists] maintain that what is conventionally called a person is 
in fact a causal series of impersonal, impermanent psychophysical processes” (Siderits 
2015, 37). The point of saying that the term “person” is a conventional designation is 
that we have as a matter of social convention a single term, a noun, which refers to the 
totality of psychophysical processes which are causally related both synchronically and 
diachronically. We, then, assume that the use of the term “person” entails that there is 
a single entity to which the term refers. In effect, we hypostatize the term. We take the 
abstract noun “person” to refer to a single concrete reality. I shall have more to say later 
about the way which our language constructs the cognitive illusion of the self. 
Thus, the idea that there is an entity over and above the psychophysical processes 
that constitute the person is not necessary to explain the continuity of these processes 
or the diachronic unification of a multiplicity of different mental states. Nor can such 
an entity be directly observed. While this does not in itself prove that there could be no 
such entity, the arguments above, if correct, can at least claim to have demonstrated 
that the postulation of a subject of experience which is transcendent to the aggregates 
is unnecessary; that it is unnecessary to posit a substantive agent to explain what keeps 
the stream of experience going. We can, then, employ the principle of lightness, 
classically known as Occam’s razor. The principle of lightness holds that the best 
explanation for a range of phenomena is to have as few entities as necessary to explain 
the problems posed by the phenomena. In other words, a theory developed to explain 
some range of phenomena should not multiply entities beyond what is necessary to 
explain the phenomena. Thus, if the person and the apparent continuity of 
consciousness can be explained without positing a self, it is reasonable to assume that 
there is no self. Positing a self would simply be positing an additional entity for which 
there is no need. The reasonable conclusion, then, is that the self does not exist and, 
therefore, that the belief that there is such a self is a false belief. But is this false belief 
also an illusion? 
If the problem of the self were simply the problem of having a false belief, then 
philosophical argumentation should be sufficient to dispel it; and it would then follow 
that with sufficient philosophical investigation the suffering from which the Buddhist 
soteriological project begins would be extinguished. However, it is readily 
acknowledged that while philosophical analysis and argumentation may prepare the 
ground for making the Buddhist doctrine of no-self credible, it will not be sufficient. 
This is because the belief that each of us has within us a self which is permanent and 
ontologically separate from others and from the world is based on a “primal confusion” 
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2015, 10). In other words, the false belief that there is a self is not just a false belief but 
an illusion. 
 
3.  WHAT IS AN ILLUSTION? 
IN WHAT WAYS MIGHT THE SELF BE CONSIDERED AN ILLUSION? 
 
An illusion is not simply a false belief, although some false beliefs are illusions. Let 
me then begin with Freud’s claim that “we call a belief an illusion when a wish-
fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its 
relation to reality” (Freud 1989, 40). In this sense, the function of the belief is to satisfy 
some basic wishes or desires.5 From this it follows that a belief which is an illusion in 
Freud’s sense of the term will strongly resist any arguments or evidence to the contrary. 
However, Freud does acknowledge that “illusions need not necessarily be false – that 
is to say, unrealizable or in contradiction to reality” (Freud 1989, 39).6 Thus, even if 
the belief in the existence of the self were true, it would still count as an illusion so long 
as it is motivated primarily not by evidence or argument but by wishes that the belief 
satisfies. 
While illusions in Freud’s sense of the term might not be false, there are two other 
senses of illusion which claim that they entail a significant misrepresentation of reality. 
The first of these are beliefs which are so interwoven with our thinking that they are 
simply taken for granted. These are properly speaking “cognitive” illusions, and might 
be also called “metaphysical” illusions in that they are beliefs about the fundamental 
nature of reality. Such cognitive or metaphysical illusions may be susceptible to reason 
but are nonetheless difficult to dislodge. If the belief in the self is a cognitive illusion, 
then even credible philosophical arguments against its existence will be strongly 
resisted; and even if the arguments are accepted intellectually, the belief will tend to 
reassert itself. 
The second way in which an illusion may produce a misunderstanding of reality 
may be called a “perceptual” or “phenomenal” illusion in that what exists appears 
differently than what it is. Perceptual or phenomenal illusions are not themselves beliefs, 
although they often lead us to accept certain beliefs. They, therefore, cannot be 
dispelled by philosophical argument alone. They can, however, be seen to be illusions 
through careful experiential examination. For example, in the Kanizsa square illusion 
(Figure 1 below), drawing one’s attention to the space between any of the black objects 
makes it clear that there are no lines between them and, therefore, that the appearance 
of the square is an illusion. Nonetheless, as soon as one moves back from this close 
 
5 Freud, of course, takes these wishes or desires to reside in the unconscious mind. However, Freud’s 
general definition of illusion can be accepted without the endorsement of his theory of the unconscious. 
On the other hand, I do think that for a belief to be primarily motivated by wish or desire requires that 
the desire be not conscious in some sense, as otherwise it would be difficult to disregard evidence or 
arguments that ran counter to it. 
6 Freud distinguishes an illusion from a delusion in that the latter is necessarily “in contradiction to 
reality.” While the boundary line between the two is not always clear, Freud suggests as an example that 
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attention, the illusion of the square reappears. Given the way our mind naturally 
structures our perceptions, it fills in the spaces between the black objects, creating the 
illusion of a square which does not exist. As a result, it is not possible to make the 
square disappear even when we know that it does not exist. Thus, if the self is a 
phenomenal illusion, it should be an illusion based on the way our mind naturally 
structures our experience, but it should also be capable of being seen as an illusion by 
careful experiential examination. As we shall see, such examination will require more 
than ordinary introspection. It will require special meditative techniques. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: The Kanizsa Square Illusion 
 
While analytically, it is useful to keep the three senses of illusion separate, they will 
in practice often be conjoined. Beliefs motivated by strong wishes are often strongly 
supported by cognitive illusions, and such cognitive illusions are often generated by 
basic intuitions or feelings based on the way our mind organizes our experiences. Thus, 
if the self is an illusion, the belief that it exists may be derived from basic human wishes, 
reinforced by beliefs that are cognitive illusions, and grounded in our phenomenal 
intuition of self, what may be called our “I” sense, that cannot be dissolved without the 
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4.  THE SELF AS WISH-FULFILLMENT,  
AS COGNITIVE ILLUSION, AND AS PHENOMENAL ILLUSION 
 
I now want to consider in some detail how the illusion of self exists in the three forms 
discussed above. I will begin with the illusion of self as a wish fulfillment. While there 
may be, of course, a number of different kinds of wishes that are bound up with the 
belief in the existence of the self, I would suggest one that has a universal appeal. This 
is the wish that for continued existence, for immortality, for eternal life; and this wish 
is closely connected with a second wish – the wish for some universal being or force 
that would protect us from harm. “Two ideas are psychologically rooted in man: self-
protection and self-preservation. For self-protection man has created God….For self-
preservation man has conceived the idea of an immortal soul, or Atman, which will live 
eternally. These ideas are so deeply rooted in man…that he does not want to hear…any 
teaching against them” (Rahula 1974, 51-52). In Judeo-Christian-Islamic thought, these 
two wishes converge insofar as God creates and guarantees the continued existence of 
the soul; in Brahmanic thought, the claim that the Atman is the Brahman, the ultimate 
foundation of the universe, guaranties that one’s true self cannot perish. Furthermore, 
the wish that life does not end with death is also motivated by the general goal of human 
happiness insofar as that goal is bound up with the attempt to give one’s life meaning 
and purpose as a whole, a meaning and purpose which go beyond and situate our 
specific projects in the more encompassing project of human happiness. Belief in the 
self gives one the sense of being the narrator and central character of one’s life and, 
therefore, gives one’s life events a sense of a larger meaning and purpose. But this, in 
turn, requires that this “self” be open continuously to the future. Without such a central 
character, the more general goal of human happiness seems insubstantial and transient.7 
The belief that there is some core essential self that persists throughout our lives is 
also an illusion in the second sense discussed above, as the belief seems to be so 
interwoven into our thinking about ourselves that it is taken for granted and arguments 
to the contrary will be strongly resisted. In this sense, the belief that we have such a 
self is a cognitive illusion. I suggest that there are at least four interrelated factors that 
make it a cognitive illusion – the subject-predicate form of our language, the use of 
certain terms as convenient designators, our tendency to hypostatize and essentialize, 
and our use of indexical expressions. 
Our subject-predicate language creates sentence structures in which the subject as 
noun or pronoun is separate from the action designated by the verb. “Nouns…are a 
shared convention of language which artificially creates islands of meaning upon a 
constantly shifting sea of becoming.…Any time that we use self in a sentence…we are 
forced into using it as an agent noun….In short, self is a noun that cannot be verbed” 
(Olendzki 2016, 112). Thus, we take the “self” to be a subject separate from the 
processes to which it is connected and an entity which initiates and controls these 
 
7 I am indebted to Mark Siderits for this argument. “Realizing one’s mortality radically undermines this 
[happiness-seeking] enterprise. The difficulty is not just that my present projects come to seem parochial 
and thus trivial…[but] that such projects derive their point from the larger happiness-seeking project in 
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processes. Closely allied to this is the convenient designator “person” which we tend 
to hypostatize. In other words, we represent the abstract noun “person” as if it were a 
concrete reality and believe that there must be some concrete entity within the person 
which is more than the changing psychophysical processes.8 Furthermore, when we 
classify and categorize, we tend to ignore the fact that our classifications are 
conventional, and we, therefore, assume that the things which we classify together have 
a real essence which is responsible for their being those kinds of things. Thus, when 
we use the term “person,” we assume that there is some essential entity which is the 
core of the person, an entity which remains constant throughout the changes which the 
person undergoes. Finally, our use of the indexicals “I” and “me” suggests that when I 
say ‘I think’ or ‘I feel’, there must be an “I” which is separate from the thinking and 
the feeling, an “I” which controls and is responsible for the thinking, and a “me” which 
is separate from “you.”9 
There is yet a deeper way in which the illusion of the self is manifested, and this is 
as a phenomenal or perceptual illusion. What appears in this illusion is an intuition or 
feeling whose appearance does not disappear even if the philosophical arguments are 
accepted and even if we are not under the sway of the cognitive illusion discussed 
above. My thoughts, feelings, emotions, intentions, desires, etc., are immediately 
experienced in the first-person perspective as mine. Here we may speak of the 
phenomenal self, a sense of self which is manifested pre-reflectively and perhaps even 
pre-linguistically, what I suggested earlier may also be called an “I” sense. Various 
strands of our phenomenal field interweave to construct the sense, intuition, or feeling 
of self – the sense of me being inside our body and, more specifically, my head, the 
feeling that I am distinct from others, the feeling that I can initiate and control my 
thoughts and actions, and the memory of myself having existed in the past. 
I can look in the mirror and “see myself,” but what I actually see is the part of my 
body reflected by that mirror. I, however, do not experience the reflection as simply my 
body, but see the reflection of my body as the reflection of some inner “me.” This 
perceiving of my “self” is not an inference but an immediate apprehension of myself 
within my body. “When we look at the mirror, we see the outward appearance of our 
self but we believe that the image is simply the outer shell of the body we occupy. We 
believe there is so much more to our self on the inside” (Bruce Hood 2012, 292). 
Furthermore, this “I” is not experienced as something momentary which changes with 
the motions of my body but is experienced as continually within my head from where 
it moves the other parts of my body. “…whatever is part of your conscious Ego is 
endowed with a feeling of ‘mineness,’ a conscious sense of ownership…, a deeper sense 
of selfhood having to do with owning and controlling your body as a whole” (Metzinger 
2009, 5). 
 
8  “…it is difficult to resist the sense that we are aware of the self as something distinct from all 
empirically given content. The Buddhist Reductionist would explain this phenomenon as a result of 
hypostatization. And this…is induced by our use of the convenient designator ‘person’” (Siderits 2015, 
44). 
9 It used to be thought that when rain occurs, there was a god who is responsible for it. We, however, no 
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When I am thinking about what I will do next, I am aware that I am influenced by 
a variety of factors and often constrained not only externally but internally. 
Nonetheless, in wrestling with any decision, I feel myself as self-determining, able to 
decide which influences to follow or, through an effort of will, even to overcome these 
influences and internal constraints. In other words, while I can recognize the effects of 
certain causal forces, I experience myself as able to rise above them and choose to 
move against them. “If we take our own phenomenology seriously, we clearly 
experience ourselves as beings that can initiate new causal chains” (Metzinger 2009, 
126). 
When I remember something that happened in the past, I do not merely remember 
it as a past event but as something that happened to me. In fact, my sense that I exist 
over time is predominantly based on my memory of these events as having been 
experienced by me. This is episodic memory, and it is perhaps the most important factor 
in the constitution of the phenomenal self. “Several psychological factors…persistently 
reaffirm to the individual that there is an enduring self. Perhaps the most obvious of 
these psychological factors is episodic memory – memory of experiences. It’s widely 
thought that when a person remembers an experience, she remembers the experience 
as having happened to her” (Garfield 2018, 290). It does not matter whether what I 
remember actually happened. What is important is that I see myself in those memories. 
Episodic memory may also be a bridge between the phenomenal illusion of self and the 
cognitive illusion of self, as there seems to be a close link between the raw memories 
of myself having done or experienced certain things and my reports in the first-person 
of those experiences. Episodic memory is also the basis for a narrative sense of self 
which I will discuss shortly. 
I interact with various people throughout the day, and I sometimes recognize that 
my way of relating is different with a number of them. Nonetheless, although my roles 
may be different, I experience myself as being the same individual playing different 
roles and as distinct from the individuals with whom I interact. My experience of self 
in relation to others is not an inference but a direct apprehension of myself in relation 
to other persons. In fact, there is good reason to think that the phenomenal sense of self 
was initially constructed in the early stages of the child’s life through interaction with 
parents or other caretakers. This is perhaps why we cannot remember what it was to be 
an infant, why episodic memory seems to begin at early childhood.10 I have more to 
say about this later when I discuss the social and narrative construction of the self illusion. 
 
5.  THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTION  
OF THE PHENOMENAL SELF 
 
I now want to consider what may be the underlying causes of the phenomenal self, the 
underlying causes which construct the sense of “I”. More recent writing in the field of 
 
10 “It’s not that you have forgotten what it was like to be an infant – you simply were not “you” at that 
age because there was no constructed self, and so you cannot make sense of early experiences in the 
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neuropsychology has pointed to processes in the brain that generate what the German 
philosopher Thomas Metzinger11 refers to as a “phenomenal-self model” (PSM), and 
he claims that it is these processes which generates the illusion of self. To define the 
PSM, Metzinger discusses the rubber hand illusion. In this illusion, one of the hands of 
the subject is concealed from view, and she observes a visible rubber hand in front of 
her on the desk. The visible rubber hand and the subject’s own concealed hand are then 
stroked simultaneously. What the subject experiences, according to Metzinger, is this: 
“Suddenly, you experience the rubber hand as your own.…What you feel in the rubber-
hand illusion is what I call the content of the phenomenal self-model (PSM) – the 
conscious model of the organism as a whole that is activated by the brain….The content 
of the PSM is the Ego” (Metzinger 2009, 3). Metzinger then argues that the PSM 
establishes the physical boundaries of the self, a body image which could be different, 
as evidenced in out-of-body experiences,12  and that without the PSM I would not 
experience the parts of my body or my mental processes as mine. “Only if you have a 
self-model can you experience your hands and your arms as parts of your own body. 
Only if you have a self-model can you experience certain cognitive processes in your 
brain as your own thoughts and certain events in the motor parts of your brain as your 
own intentions and acts of will” (Metzinger 2009, 115). The PSM is the illusion that 
conscious experience is “my” experience, that it is inside “my” body and, thus, is the 
center and owner of its experiences.  
In order for this to happen, the brain creates both a model of the world and a model 
of oneself within the world. Metzinger explains this as follows:  
 
First, our brains generate a world-simulation, so perfect that we do not recognize it as an 
image in our minds. Then, they generate an inner image of ourselves as a whole. This image 
includes not only our body and our psychological states but also our relationship to the past 
and the future, as well as to other conscious beings. The internal image of the person-as-a-
whole is the phenomenal Ego, the “I” or “self” as it appears in conscious experience….By 
placing the self-model within the world-model, a center is created. That center is what we 
experience as ourselves, the Ego. It is the origin of what philosophers often call the first-
person perspective (Metzinger 2009, 6-7). 
 
Thus, the PSM is constructed as a first-person perspective centered within a virtual 
world. By exercising control in this virtual reality, I can effectively navigate my 
environment.13 However, our ability to navigate our environment requires that we not 
 
11 Thomas Metzinger is a German philosopher and phenomenologist who works closely with and whose 
writings are informed by cognitive and neuroscientists. 
12 “Could one create a full-body analog of the rubber-hand illusion? Could the entire self be transposed 
to a location outside of the body? As a matter of fact, there are phenomenal states in which people have 
the robust feeling of being outside their physical body – these are the so-called out-of-body experiences, 
or OBEs” (Metzinger 2009, 5). 
13 Metzinger is not claiming that there is no reality other than the virtual reality, that what we call reality 
is only a subjective phenomenon. “Yes, there is an outside world and, yes, there is an objective reality, 
but in moving through this world, we constantly apply unconscious filter mechanisms, and in doing so, 
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recognize the virtual reality as virtual. To make this point, Metzinger uses the analogy 
of a flight simulator.  
 
The human brain can be compared to a modern flight simulator in several respects. Like a 
flight simulator, it constructs and continuously updates an internal model of external reality 
by using a continuous stream of input supplied by the sensory organs and employing past 
experience as a filter….For us, phenomenal reality is not a simulational space constructed 
by our brains….[I]t is the world we live in. Its virtuality is hidden, whereas a flight 
simulator is easily recognized as a flight simulator (Metzinger 2009, 107). 
 
In order to exercise control in this virtual reality, the PSM is also constructed as an 
illusion of self as agent, of an executive control center, although there is, in fact, no 
agent controlling the show.  
 
The self-model…binds the processes by which the mind creates and compares competing 
alternatives for action with feedback from your bodily movements. This binding turns the 
experience of movement into the experience of an action. But note, once again, that neither 
the “mind” nor the self-model is a little man in the head; there is no one doing the creating, 
the comparing, and the deciding. If the dynamical-systems theory is correct, then all of this 
is a case of dynamical self-organization in the brain (Metzinger 2009, 121).  
 
It should be added that this “dynamic self-organization of the brain” is not a single 
process located in a part of the brain but a multiple set of brain processes. As the British 
developmental and cognitive neuropsychologist Bruce Hood puts it, “The brain has 
many distributed jobs….[T]he sense of self that most of us experience is not to be found 
in any one area. Rather it emerges out of the orchestra of different brain processes like 
a symphony of the self, just as Buddha and Hume said” (Hood 2012, xii). However, 
brain processes alone do not construct the illusion of self. 
 
6.  THE SOCIAL AND NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTION  
OF THE ILLUSION OF SELF 
 
The fully developed sense of self emerges out of the interplay between brain processes, 
social interaction, and narrative construction. “This development of the self emerges 
across childhood as the interplay between the modeling brain, constructing stories from 
experience, and the influences of other people” (Hood 2012, xiv). While the precise 
relation of these factors may be somewhat in dispute, there is, I think, little 
disagreement that human beings are a social species and that the desire for social 
interaction is an innate component of the human genome. This innate desire for 
sociality is organized by our brain processes and lays the foundations for the emergence 
of the sense of self. “The mind that generates our sense of self is a product of a brain 
 
mechanisms are our sensory systems and our brain….[W]e see only what our reality tunnel allows us to 
see” (Metzinger 2009, 8-9). Thus, our internal representation of the world and the PSM make it possible 
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that has evolved to become social. But in being social, the self is radically altered by 
the presence of others and our need to fit in with them” (Hood 2012, 184). In fact, it 
may be more accurate to say that the emergence of the sense of self develops out of our 
interactions with others. George Herbert Mead has theorized this development nicely. 
The self, writes Mead, is not something which is there from birth. What is there at 
birth is the human body with its desires, but the self can easily be distinguished from 
the human body. “The body can be there and can operate in a very intelligent fashion 
without there being a self involved in the experience….We can lose parts of the body 
without any serious invasion of the self” (Mead 1963, 136). For Mead, the self is 
something that emerges and is constructed through the individual becoming an object 
to herself. But how is this possible? “How can an individual get outside himself 
(experientially) in such a way as to become an object to himself?” (Mead 1963, 
138).The answer Mead gives is that the individual can only see herself as an object by 
assuming the vantage point of another toward herself, since only the other can initially 
see her as an object. For the self to exist, I must stand outside myself and take the 
attitude of another toward myself, which is why, for Mead, the construction of the self 
is necessarily a social construction and, therefore, must incorporate the attitudes of 
others within myself. In short, the individual human organism develops a sense of self 
only when it learns to experience itself from the “particular standpoints of other 
individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the 
social group as a whole” (Mead 1963, 138).14  
Once the sense of self has emerged, we can begin to communicate with others 
through language, and we can also begin to use language to think, which is itself 
initially an internalization of our communication with the other. With the emergence 
of the sense of self, episodic memory also emerges, and we begin to use language to 
create stories about ourselves, stories we tell to ourselves and to others. In so doing, we 
create narratives of our lives by piecing together certain episodic memories with a 
variety of distortions, some of which are fictitious elements which we (unconsciously) 
invent in order to tell a story which affirms our sense of self. In fact, much of episodic 
memory is already narrative construction, as the stories embodied in the memories 
helps to weave the memories together and to make sense of our experiences. 
“Memories are not recordings but stories we retrieve from the compost heap that is our 
long-term memory; we construct these stories to make sense of the events we have 
experienced” (Hood 2012, 220). As we construct these narratives, we give content to 
the illusion of self, and we further develop the illusion as the central character in a set 
of stories. The various stories that we tell about ourselves provide the scaffolding for 
the fully developed illusion of self, and, as these stories seem meaningless without a 
central character, they reinforce the illusion and make it difficult to extinguish. Thus, 
Bruce Hood suggests an analogy between the sense of self at the center of the narratives 
 
14 Mead’s analysis often resonates in contemporary analyses of the construction of the sense of self. For 
example, Evan Thompson writes, “Indeed, being able to think of oneself as a self seems inseparable 
from being able mentally to grasp an outside view of oneself, that is, from the vantage point of the other” 
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and the Kanizsa square illusion. “There is no self at the core. Rather, it emerges as the 
‘center of a narrative gravity.’ In the same way that we can see a square at the center 
of the arrangement in [the Kanizsa square illusion], it is an illusion created by the 
surrounding elements” (Hood 2012, xiii).15  
 
7.  THE EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT  
AND FUNCTION OF THE ILLUSION OF SELF 
 
If the sense of self is an illusion, then why did it develop in our species? To answer this 
question, we need first to recognize that the evolutionary development of a trait within 
a species need not track reality accurately. The grid of natural selection does not 
function to develop an accurate perception of reality but to perpetuate and proliferate 
the gene pool. As the evolutionary psychologist Robert Wright notes, 
 
Genetically based traits that in the past contributed to genetic proliferation have flourished, 
while traits that didn’t have fallen by the wayside. And the traits that have survived this 
test include mental traits – structures and algorithms that are built into the brain and shape 
our everyday experience. So if you ask the question “What kinds of perceptions and 
thoughts and feelings guide us through life each day?” the answer, at the most basic level, 
isn’t “The kinds of thoughts and feelings and perceptions that give us an accurate picture 
of reality.” No, at the most basic level the answer is “The kinds of thoughts and feelings 
and perceptions that helped our ancestors get genes into the next generation” (Wright 2017, 
3-4). 
 
Thus, that the self is an illusion does not negate its usefulness. It was useful to our 
ancestors, and in many ways it continues to be useful for us today.16 It is a device for 
directing our behaviors so that we can efficiently navigate both the physical and social 
world, and it is a device which can sometimes be turned off when it is not needed. “The 
Ego is a tool for controlling and planning your behavior and for understanding the 
behavior of others. Whenever the organism needs this tool, the brain activates a PSM. 
If – as, for instance, in dreamless deep sleep – the tool is not needed anymore, it is 
turned off” (Metzinger 2009, 8). The illusion of self also has an important internal 
function for the human organism. It evolved so that a multitude of experiences which 
would otherwise be fragmented could be bound together. It provides a focal point 
which allows a multitude of experiences to be organized into a coherent narrative. 
 
15 The idea of the self as the “center of narrative gravity” was first introduced by Daniel Dennett in his 
essay “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity” (Dennett 1992). For Dennett, the center of narrative 
gravity is the central character in the story. I, therefore, create the sense of self through creating myself 
as the central character in the stories that I tell. 
16 That an evolutionarily developed trait was useful to our ancestors does not entail that it is useful for 
us today. In fact, the opposite may be the case. “The modern environment can take various kinds of 
feelings that served our ancestors in this Darwinian sense and render them counterproductive….Violent 
rage and the yearnings of a sweet tooth are good examples. These feelings were once “true” at least in 
the pragmatic sense of guiding the organism toward behaviors that were in some sense good for it. But 








Why did we evolve the self illusion? Like every other illusion our brain generates, it serves 
a useful purpose….Experiences are fragmented episodes unless they are woven together in 
a meaningful narrative. This is why the self pulls it all together. Without a focus, the 
massive parallel processing in our brain means that we would be overwhelmed by the sheer 
volume of computations if we ever had to deal with them individually” (Hood 2012, 290). 
 
By creating the illusion that our experiences hold together coherently, the phenomenal 
self also creates the illusion that that we are coherent agents, and this has an important 
social as well as internal function, a social function which gave our species an 
evolutionary advantage in the struggle for survival. By thinking of ourselves as 
coherent agents, we also convince others that we are coherent agents; and this allows 
us to treat each other as morally responsible beings. 
 
Why would natural selection design a brain that leaves people deluded about themselves? 
One answer is that if we believe something about ourselves, that will help us convince 
other people to believe it. And certainly it’s to our benefit – or, more precisely, it would 
have been to the benefit of the genes of our hunter-gatherer ancestors – to convince the 
world that we’re coherent, consistent actors who have things under control (Wright 2017, 
81). 
 
In all, the illusion of self also made it possible for us to develop fully as social beings, 
and with this development there emerged another form of evolution – cultural evolution. 
“The PSM of Homo sapiens is probably one of nature’s best inventions….[I]t allowed 
biological evolution to explode into cultural evolution” (Metzinger 2009, 4-5). Thus, if 
the self is an illusion, it would seem to be a highly positive illusion. From an 
evolutionary point of view (both biological and cultural evolution) the illusion of self 
was a necessary illusion. Furthermore, there are good reasons to think that it still has 
some very useful, perhaps even essential functions. Why not, then, simply continue to 
act as if it existed, even if we are convinced philosophically that it does not exist. 
We are now left with a dilemma for the Buddhism’s soteriological project. 
Buddhism insists that the illusion of self is the ultimate cause of dukkha and argues that 
enlightenment requires extinguishing this illusion. On the other hand, Buddhists need 
to recognize that the illusion of self is at least highly useful if not essential for the 
survival and continued development of the human species. “The Buddhist can allow 
that the cognitive illusion of self is adaptive – it leads us to act to preserve ourselves as 
organisms and to raise our young” (Garfield 2018, 294). And, in any case, given that 
the illusion of self is a powerful illusion deeply rooted in our deepest wishes, in the 
structure of our language, in our social and narrative construction, and in the 
fundamental organization of the human brain as designed by natural selection, it is 
difficult to see how we can extinguish the illusion even if we would wish to do so. It is 
possible that we can change how it functions, but it is not at all clear that it is desirable 
or possible to make it disappear. “What of the future of this self illusion? It’s unlikely 
to disappear….One can speculate how changes will impact upon the individual’s 
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a pretty strong sense of self to survive” (Hood 2012, 296). We now need to consider 
how Buddhism envisions accomplishing the task of extinguishing the illusion of self, 
how it would have us develop a coherent and consistent no-self or, as I will explain 
shortly, non-self perspective required for the project of enlightenment.  
 
8.  MINDFULNESS MEDITATION: SEEING THROUGH  
THE ILLUSION OF SELF AND THE NON-SELF PERSPECTIVE 
 
Extinguishing the illusion of self would require dispelling not just the attachment to the 
idea of self at the cognitive level but also the more primal appearance of self at the 
phenomenal level. Among other things, it would need to eliminate the first-person 
perspective. There would be no first-person perspective, because there would be no self 
inhabiting the person. Robert Wright has suggested that Buddhist enlightenment be 
termed “the view from nowhere”17 and considers the following worry: “The view from 
nowhere…carries none of my selfish biases, or yours, and that in a certain sense isn’t 
even a particularly human perspective, or the perspective of any other species. This, 
truly, would be a view that defied natural selection’s authority, because natural 
selection is all about specific perspectives” (Wright 2017, 240).18 Thus, the no-self 
perspective is really the absence of a perspective that would draw a distinction between 
a first-person, second person, and third person perspective. It might, therefore, be better 
termed a “non-self perspective,” and the development of such a perspective would seem 
to go against the evolutionary trajectory of our species.19 This non-self perspective, 
then, would transcend the perspective of what is good for me in opposition to what is 
good for you or even what is good for my species in opposition to other species. While 
Wright does not shy away from the problem of how it is possible to go against what 
human (and perhaps primate) evolution has built into our genome, he does suggest that 
opposing evolution at this stage of development may be precisely what we need to do, 
because “we’ve gotten to a point in human history where the sense of specialness could 
actually endanger the continued flourishing of human life” (Wright 2017, 242). Thus, 
although natural selection built into our species the illusion of self, we should not 
perpetuate the illusion and are not forced to do so, since “natural selection has also 
equipped us with tools for addressing the problem – rational and reflective faculties 
that in principle can transcend the circumstances of our birth” (Wright 2017, 245). Is 
 
17 Wright appropriates the phrase from the title of Thomas Nagel’s book. Nagel uses the term to discuss 
the tension between the necessity of viewing things from a certain perspective and the ideal of objectivity 
which would transcend our particular viewpoint. See Nagel (1986). 
18 Of course, there would still be the organism’s perspective of perceptual phenomena – I would still see 
the table from a certain spatial position – but it would lack a sense of the self viewing those phenomena 
and would, therefore, lack a sense of self-interest and self craving and attachment. 
19 It is probably the case that every sentient species has a perspective, and many of them might have a 
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this really possible? Buddhism claims to have developed such a tool in the form of 
mindfulness meditation, or vipassanā.20 
Vipassanā is a form of mindfulness meditation discussed in the Pāli Canon. It is 
aimed at seeing clearly and non-judgmentally the moment to moment phenomena for 
the purpose of insight into the nature of what we call our mind. It simply observes the 
passing thought, feeling, desire, intention, memory, emotion, etc., noting them each as 
they arise and disappear. In contrast to concentration meditation, which narrows the 
focus of attention to one object of consciousness, vipassanā opens attention to the 
whole range of consciousness. It is important to emphasize that vipassanā is not like 
ordinary awareness, attention, or introspection. “All consciousness involves awareness 
in the sense of a knowing or experiencing of an object. But with the practice of 
mindfulness [vipassanā] awareness is applied at a special pitch….[T]he mind is trained 
to remain in the present, open, quiet, and alert, contemplating the present event. All 
judgements and interpretations have to be suspended, or if they occur, just registered 
and dropped. The task is simply to note whatever comes up just as it is occurring, riding 
the changes of events in the way a surfer rides the waves on the sea” (Bodhi 1994, 75-
76). Vipassanā practice makes it possible “to gain firsthand insight into how the mind 
constructs a seemingly stable reality out of the ever-changing flux of experience” 
(Siegel and Germer 2012, 30). 
The first part of this articled surveyed the Buddhist arguments for the claim that 
there is no self. Although these arguments are important, I think that their primary 
importance lies in getting us to take the Buddhist doctrine of no-self seriously. The 
main assumptions on which these arguments are based – the impermanence claim, the 
claim that the psychophysical processes are not under our control, the exhaustiveness 
claim, and the claim of dependent origination – all require some verification in 
experience, and vipassanā provides a controlled way to verify the claims experientially. 
Through vipassanā, one can observe the way mental processes arise as a result of other 
mental and bodily processes (verifying dependent origination), one can observe how 
rapidly these processes arise and disappear and are replaced by other mental process 
(verifying impermanence), and one can ultimately come to recognize that there is 
nothing behind these processes that can be called a self.  
Buddhism, however, claims that vipassanā can do more than simply corroborate 
the assumptions which ground the Buddhist arguments for no-self. Vipassanā can help 
us see how the illusion of self is constructed at the experiential level, why we are so 
attached to the idea of the self, why it is so difficult to give up the belief in the self, 
why there is a strong tendency to resist the arguments, and why the Buddhist idea of 
no-self seems so counter-intuitive. It can also more directly reveal that there is no self 
and how craving and grasping at the passing phenomena brings about suffering. 
“Mindfulness works like an electronic microscope….It sees the transitory and passing 
 
20 The term mindfulness (sati) is used both to refer to certain kinds of meditative practices and to the 
faculty which can be developed by those practices. As a faculty, it is the capacity to be receptively 
attentive to and aware of whatever is happening in the present moment. As a practice, the term 
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nature of everything that is perceived….It sees that there is no sense grabbing onto any 
of these passing shows….And finally, mindfulness sees the inherent selflessness of all 
phenomena” (Gunaratana 2015, 138). In doing this, vipassanā also makes it possible 
to clearly see that that there is no inner CEO controlling the processes that we call our 
mind. “So if the conscious mind isn’t in control, what is in control?…the answer may 
be: nothing in particular. The closer we look at the mind, the more it seems to consist 
of a lot of different players, players that sometimes collaborate but sometimes fight for 
control, with victory going to the one that is in some sense the strongest” (Wright 2017, 
77). 
Finally, Buddhism claims that if practiced sufficiently in conjunction with other 
Buddhist practices of the eight-fold path, vipassanā can extinguish the illusion of self 
and create an abiding awareness of selflessness. 21  “Given that the truth of 
impermanence serves as the main argument for the doctrine of selflessness, it should 
not surprise us that the active perception of arising and cessation is fundamental to this 
doctrine as well….[A] perception of the aggregates, their arising, and their passing 
away is explicitly said to trigger the attitude of selflessness” (Schulman 2014, 164). 
The result is that the Buddhist practitioner is now far along the path to enlightenment. 
The Buddhist practitioner now does not merely understand that the self is an illusion 
but has laid the foundation for a fully developed non-self perspective, a way of 
experiencing that is radically different from our ordinary first-person experience, and 
which radically transforms the way we relate to other persons, to nature, and to the 
world in general.  
 
When one achieves a direct realization of emptiness and selflessness – very late on the path 
– one generates engaged bodhicitta, which is a completely impersonal commitment 
involving an experience of the world that does not represent a self at its center. Importantly, 
the difference between aspirational and engaged bodhicitta is characterized…by the mode 
of apprehension of selflessness. The difference is between an inferential, or merely 
cognitive, understanding and an immediate awareness of selflessness that frames 
experience (Garfield 2018, 286). 
 
In other words, at the point of the path where one generates bodhicitta, even the 
phenomenal self is extinguished. 
 
21 Mindfulness, whose development requires vipassanā, is only one of the components of the eight-fold 
path. The others are: right concentration, which is the other meditative discipline and also a component 
of vipassanā; right effort; right understanding, the philosophical discipline; right thought or intention, 
and the practices of good ethical conduct which are right speech, right action, right livelihood. Thus, for 
Buddhism, vipassanā, even with the guidance of the philosophical arguments, cannot extinguish the 
illusion of self in the absence of the other components of the eight-fold path. This is because the full 
development of the awareness of selflessness is not just an experiential insight which corroborates the 
philosophical arguments but requires a radically different form of life, a transformation of one’s whole 
way of being, a fundamental reorganization of ones habits and attitudes from selfish cravings, 
attachments, and aversions to compassionate concern for others. Thus, the Buddhist meditative 
disciplines cannot lead to a full awareness of selflessness without the consistent practice of the other 
components of the eight-fold path. In short, while vipassanā provides the insight necessary for a non-








9. IS IT POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN 
A CONSISTENT NON-SELF PERSPECTIVE? 
 
I now want to return to the dilemma I posed earlier concerning the Buddhist 
soteriological project. Buddhist enlightenment would seem to require maintaining a 
coherent and consistent non-self perspective, as the enlightened individual has attained 
nirvana.22 To do so would seem to entail not just that we give up the philosophical idea 
of self as a metaphysical entity but that both the cognitive and the phenomenal sense 
of self are extinguished. On the cognitive level, this would entail that when we say the 
word “I”, we do not essentialize or substantialize the indexical; that we do not think of 
our experiences as being owned by a unitary entity which is independent of those 
experiences, an entity which remains the same even as those experiences change; that 
when we think of ourselves as doing something now or in the past or the future, we do 
not assume an agent behind the processes which does, did, or will do those things; and 
we do not think that there is a fixed boundary between what is me and what is not me. 
So far, it does not seem improbable that vipassanā in conjunction with the other 
Buddhist practices could produce such a change in consciousness and mode of being, 
and this is already a fundamental change. However, what about the phenomenal sense 
of self? As a reminder: the phenomenal self in our species was constructed as an 
evolutionary necessity and is still encoded in our brains; it pulls together a multitude 
of experiences both synchronically and diachronically; it filters out brain processes that 
would otherwise overwhelm are us; it is elicited and turned on through our early 
childhood interactions with caretakers, and it is required for us to develop as social 
beings; it allow us to present ourselves to others as responsible persons; it is bound up 
with episodic memory and reinforced through narrative construction which gives these 
episodic memories a coherent structure with myself as the central character; and it 
constructs a model of myself in relation to a simulated model of the world that is 
necessary for successfully navigating social and physical reality. How, then, is it 
possible to act coherently, to plan and to choose effectively in the world without at least 
the sense of self at the phenomenal level? 
In agreement with Buddhism, let us grant that vipassanā, in conjunction with the 
other Buddhist practices elaborated by the eight-fold path, can produce a sense of 
selflessness that makes it possible to experience ourselves and the world in a radically 
 
22 Although I use the term “attaining Nirvana” as a convenient locution, I recognize that the expression 
can be misleading, as Nirvana is strictly speaking not something to be attained in any ordinary sense of 
the word. Rupert Gethin suggests that it is best understood as a verb rather than a noun, as in both Pāli 
and Sanskrit, “he attains nirvana” would best be rendered “he or she nirvana-s” or, if it describes the 
attainment after the death of the body, then “he or she paranirvana-s” (Gethin 1998, 75). Thus, Nirvana 
is not a place or a state of consciousness but the process by which the cravings and aversions are 
extinguished, by which the “fires” of the three poisons (greed/lust, hatred, and delusion) which bring 
about dukkha are extinguished. What it is like to nirvana in a positive sense is described in such terms 
as the highest happiness, the ultimate reality, the unborn, the deathless, the breaking of the cycle of 
rebirth, the unconditioned, that which is beyond cause and effect, and this suggests that there is no way 
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different way. Let us grant that we can indeed develop a perspective which would entail 
that we no longer see ourselves as ontologically separate from others and that we no 
longer prioritize our own interests over those of others. However, let us also recognize 
that a consistent non-self perspective must include extinguishing not only the cognitive 
illusion of self but also the phenomenal illusion; and, given that we must interact with 
the natural and social world in a variety of ways, it is far from clear that it is possible 
to do this continuously without the phenomenal sense of self being at least sometimes 
operative. 
Here is my hypothesis. Perhaps what happens as we move further along the path is 
that we oscillate between a non-self and a self-perspective in the same way that we 
oscillate between first seeing the illusion of the Kanizsa square, then, by careful 
attention, seeing that the square does not exist; and then, as we step back from our 
attentional focus, once again seeing the square even though we now know cognitively 
that it does not exist. Through the careful attention of vipassanā, again in conjunction 
with other Buddhist practices, we can come to experience a sense of selflessness that 
can carry over and frame our experience outside of meditative practice for a time. 
However, even as we move considerably along the path to enlightenment and Nirvana, 
the sense of self returns at least at the phenomenal level, just as the Kanizsa square 
illusion returns when we step back from close attention to the spaces between any of 
the four black figures.  
This hypotheses is at least partly supported by a sutta in the Samyutta Nikāya (85:3) 
that points out that, even when the seeker of enlightenment is no longer under the sway 
of sensual desires, even when there is a clear awareness that the aggregates are 
impermanent and not self, a subtle sense of “I am” remains. In this discourse, Khemaka, 
a disciple of the Buddha who is perhaps at the penultimate stage of the path, is 
approached by a number of other disciples who ask him whether he sees anything of 
the self in the five aggregates;  and when he declares no, they declare that he must be 
an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed.23 To this he replies that he is still not an 
arahant, since the sense of “I am” has not yet vanished even though he does not regard 
any of the aggregates as “This I am.” He then compares his situation to that of a cloth 
which, after being soiled and stained, has been extensively cleaned by a laundryman 
but which still retains “a residual smell of cleaning salt, lye or cowdung that has not 
yet vanished.”  
 
“So too, friends, even though a noble disciple has abandoned the five lower fetters, still in 
relation to the five aggregates subject to clinging, there lingers in him a residual conceit ‘I 
am,’ a desire ‘I am,’ and an underlying tendency ‘I am’ that has not yet been uprooted.” 
(Bodhi 2000, 945). 
 
It is not clear from this sutta whether or not Khemaka experiences the taint of “I am” 
continuously throughout his daily experience. However, it is likely that at least when 
practicing vipassanā, as he dispassionately observes the arising and fading away of the 
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aggregates, his phenomenal sense of self disappears, and perhaps even remains 
suppressed for a time as he continues to cultivate mindfulness outside of formal 
meditation. At least this is my experience in practicing vipassanā, and I am nowhere 
near the penultimate stage of the path that Khemaka had reached. Thus, it seems likely 
that those on the path to enlightenment will oscillate between a non-self and a self 
perspective and that, as one comes closer to enlightenment, the self perspective takes a 
more subtle phenomenal form.  
Still, the question remains, what happens when those on the path finally become 
enlightened, what happens when Nirvana is finally attained? This same sutta does have 
an answer to this. Khemaka concludes that as he “dwells thus contemplating the rise 
and fall of the aggregates….the underlying tendency ‘I am’ that had not been uprooted 
– this comes to be uprooted” (Bodhi 2000, 945). And the sutta concludes with Khemaka 
and his listeners all becoming enlightened. If we take this as the decisive Buddhist 
answer, it means that for the fully enlightened person even the most subtle phenomenal 
sense of “I am” is finally extinguished and will not return. Thus, it would seem that, at 
least for the classical early Buddhist position, those who are fully enlightened can 
maintain a consistent non-self perspective. While it would be presumptuous of me on 
this side of enlightenment to insist that this is incorrect, I do think that there are some 
reasons to doubt that the phenomenal sense of self can be permanently extinguished 
even for fully enlightened individuals, at least as long as they remain living human 
beings.24 
To make the problem clearer, let us consider more carefully what happens in the 
Kanizsa square illusion. The Kanizsa square is a completion illusion in which our 
brain/mind fills in what is not there in order to create a coherent perceptual structure. 
However, by careful attention and examination, we can come to see that there are no 
lines between the black figures. Still, the moment we step back from such attentive 
examination, the mind once again projects the square onto the four figures even though 
we now know that there is, in fact, no square. If we again closely examine the spaces 
between the black figures, we can once again see that the appearance of the square is 
an illusion. Thus, we can oscillate between seeing the illusion of the square and seeing 
that there is no square. This is not, however, a Gestalt switch. The oscillation between 
seeing the square and, through careful attention, seeing that there is no square is not 
like the oscillation between seeing the same figure first as a duck and then as a rabbit; 
or the switch from seeing the same figure first as two faces and then as a goblet.25 In a 
Gestalt switch illusion, while we can only see one image at a time, we can choose, 
through focusing on certain parts of the figure, which image appears. However, with 
the Kanizsa square illusion, it is not a question of choice. When we step back from the 
careful examination of what is between each of the four figures and look again at the 
 
24  Buddhism distinguishes between Nirvana with residue remaining and Nirvana without residue 
remaining. The former is the attainment of Nirvana in one’s lifetime, and the residue that remains is the 
residue of the five aggregates which continue to exist even after the poisons of greed/lust, hatred, and 
delusion have been extinguished. The latter refers to Nirvana after death.  
25 I am indebted to Kin Cheung for pointing out the distinction between a replacement illusion and a 
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drawing as a whole, the square necessarily reappears. The necessity is built into the 
way our perceptual-neural system is organized.26 
In an analogous way, our phenomenal sense of self is the result of the way our 
neuro-psychological system is organized, an organization which, while initially elicited 
in the course of our early childhood interactions with parents or other caretakers and 
which is bound up with episodic memory and reinforced through narrative construction, 
is embedded in our genome. Of course, there are ways in which the Kanizsa square and 
the phenomenal sense of self are not analogous. Through vipassanā, we can at least for 
a time dismantle or suspend the phenomenal illusion of self, while, at least for me, it is 
not possible to suspend the illusion of the square if I look at the entire figure. 
Nevertheless, it is more than likely that even when one has become fully enlightened, 
the phenomenal sense of self returns periodically, because it is needed for certain 
practical functions. There are, I think, several reasons for this. The first is that 
enlightened human beings are still human beings with a human genome, and their 
brains are still organized by the imperatives of that genome which include: coordination 
of sensory data into perceptions of objects; ways of structuring experience to 
distinguish themselves from those objects and also to distinguish themselves from other 
persons (with an assist from their early childhood social interactions); and coordination 
of multiple brain processes and experiences to form thoughts, emotions, and intentions 
that will make it possible for them to plan, make choices, and act effectively in the 
world. The way the human brain is naturally organized to do this employs the device 
of the phenomenal self. Could the Buddha have planned and organized a monastic order 
without such a device? 
The second reason is that episodic memories and narrative construction are 
essential for a human understanding of our relation to the past; and to remember 
something is to remember something that I did or that happened to me; and to tell a 
story about my life is to put myself in the center of the story. It is of no small 
consequence that persons who are considered enlightened also talk about their lives in 
narrative form, and, in fact, some of them have even written autobiographies. For 
example, the Dalai Lama has written two autobiographical books, the most recent of 
which is entitled Freedom in Exile: the Autobiography of the Dalai Lama (2008). He 
surely could not have done so without having his episodic memory pieced together by 
a narrative sense of self. Of course, we might argue that perhaps the Dalai Lama is not 
fully enlightened. However, if full enlightenment is possible, then the Buddha was 
enlightened; and while the Buddha never wrote an autobiography, he certainly told his 
followers many stories about his life before he attained Nirvana, and he even claims to 
have remembered his past lives. In short, he communicated with his followers in part 
by constructing a narrative of his life in which he was the central character. 
 
26 It has been suggested to me by more than one person that it is possible to see the Kanizsa illusion as four 
black Pac-Men about to attack each other. I think, however, that this is a conceptual move rather than a 
perceptual seeing. However, even allowing that it is a perceptual seeing, it is only possible for me even to 
begin to see the figures this way by focusing only on two adjacent figures at a time and by ignoring the four 
figures as a whole. I would ask the reader to look at the Kanizsa square illusion again and determine if her 
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The third reason for thinking that even those who have become enlightened would 
at least periodically experience a phenomenal self is that it is a necessity for many kinds 
of social interactions in which they need to engage. The Buddha, as described in the 
Nikāyas, entered into many different kinds of dialogues with others to teach and explain 
the Dharma. In these dialogues, he taught the Dharma in very different ways, often 
using skillful means (upāya) to address different individuals according to their level of 
development. The Buddha also used speech in a mindful way (right speech), which 
means not just that what he said was truthful but that when he spoke, he did so 
compassionately and kindly, taking into account the specific needs and sensitivities of 
his listeners. All this required an empathetic understanding of the other, and empathy 
requires some way of distinguishing oneself from the other.27 Given that the Buddha 
was still a human being with a human genome, the most likely device that enabled him 
to do this was the phenomenal appearance of the self.  
Finally, the Buddha also knew how to navigate non-human reality. He must have 
known how to avoid stepping on snakes and eating poison mushrooms, how to keep 
warm, and find food in the forest, and, in general, once he developed the understanding 
of the “middle way” between the extremes of asceticism and hedonism, he did what 
was necessary to protect his body from harm and to remain physically healthy. While 
many animals can do this by instinct, human beings do this by generating a world 
simulation model and an image of self in relation to that world model, and this requires 
drawing some boundary line between what is oneself and what is “out there;” in effect, 
it requires experiencing oneself as a subject in relation to objects and non-human 
animals in the natural world. This is not to deny that this boundary line is an illusion, 
and clearly the Buddha would have recognized that it is an illusion, but simply to point 
out that it is sometimes necessary to utilize this illusion not only for ordinary human 
beings but even for buddhas. In all, it is highly likely that even enlightened persons, 
because they are still human beings, will oscillate between a non-self perspective and 
a phenomenal self perspective; although they, in contrast to those still on the path, may 
have more choice in when to allow the illusion of self to reappear and when to allow it 
to disappear. 
Once again, it would be presumptuous of me on this side of enlightenment to claim 
that I know that those who are enlightened would not be able to maintain a non-self 
perspective continuously. However, I want to put to rest a worry that if my hypothesis 
is correct, then enlightenment is not possible. That even those who have attained 
Nirvana might not be able to maintain a non-self perspective at all times does not entail 
that they cannot consistently think and act in fundamentally selfless ways. I would 
agree with Evan Thompson when he argues that “‘enlightenment’ or 
‘liberation’…doesn’t consist in dismantling our constructed sense of self, as may 
happen in certain meditative states. Rather, it consists in wisdom that includes not being 
 
27 Amy Coplan argues that one of the criteria for empathy is a sense of self, because in order to adopt 
the perspective of the other I must recognize that the other is separate from myself. She proposes the 
following definition: “empathy is a complex imaginative process in which an observer simulates another 
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taken in by the appearance of the self as having independent existence while that 
appearance is nonetheless still there and performing its important I-making function” 
(Thompson 2015, 366). Thus, enlightenment would be possible even if the phenomenal 
sense of self never entirely disappears. Thompson, however, seems to suggest that the 
appearance of self on the phenomenal level is only occasionally dismantled in certain 
meditative states and that this may not be very significant, because he takes the 
phenomenal sense of self, although constructed, as real in an important sense; whereas 
I regard the appearance of the phenomenal self as an illusion. This is a difference which, 
for reasons of space, I shall not attempt to discuss here.28 I do, however, want to 
reiterate that whatever the ontological status of the phenomenal self, I think that there 
is ample evidence (my own experience included) that intense vipassanā practice can 
extinguish the phenomenal appearance of self in a way that can sometimes carry over 
beyond formal meditation. Extrapolating from this, it is highly likely that fully 
enlightened individuals can dismantle and extinguish the phenomenal self continuously 
in deep meditation and that, by being receptively attentive outside meditation, they can 
often maintain a non-self perspective for a considerable period of time. If this is correct, 
then it is only when enlightened individuals are engaged in particular kinds of activities 
that require the phenomenal sense of self that they will need to return temporarily to a 
self perspective.  
However, because they are enlightened, when the phenomenal illusion of self 
reappears, they would still always recognize that it is an illusion not just cognitively 
but affectively. They would not be entranced by or attached to the illusion of self in the 
same way that once we understand how the magic trick works, it no longer enchants 
us. 29  Thus, the cravings and aversions and the poisons of greed/lust, hatred, and 
delusion would remain extinguished. When enlightened human beings need to interact 
with other persons or with the other parts of the natural world in ways that require a 
self perspective, they could employ the phenomenal self the way someone might play 
monopoly without attachment to winning, recognizing that it is only a game, and 
knowing that the money in the game is not real.30 In short, they could employ the 
phenomenal illusion of self without falling under its spell. Thus, those who are 
enlightened can mindfully allow the self perspective to reappear and continue to act 
with loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. And, like the 
Buddha, they could also find time for long solitary meditation retreats during the year 
 
28 The discussion would require my going into an analysis of Buddhist reductionism, which Thompson 
rejects and which I think is plausible, and a consideration of his claim that the constructed self has a 
dynamic organization which is not reducible to its component parts. 
29 “Just as uncovering a magician’s trick makes it impossible to keep on being fooled by it, lifting the 
veil of identification will make it impossible to be fooled by its content of self-identity” (Albahari 2013, 
104). 
30 I am indebted to Christopher Gowans for this analogy. In fact, the enlightened person would, if 
necessary, play the economic game of earning and spending “real” money without being attached to it 
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and take time to meditate during a part of each day when they could dispel completely 
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